Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to

address the committee. I am in favor of a regime change in Iraq.

What is at issue is the means and the timing. The issue has four

key components, all of which deserve our discussion and, indeed,

a national debate because of their implications.

First is a change of policy, after a period of over 50 years, in

which we depart from the principle of deterrence to one of preemption.

The second is the need for support from countries in the Middle

East, Asia, as well as our traditional allies in NATO, Japan, Australia,

and elsewhere, as we contemplate combat operations against Iraq.

The third is the problems associated with mounting a military

campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and then finally,

assuming success of this military campaign, the implications

for war termination, most especially the requirements for nationbuilding.

First, the issue of deterrence and preemption. For more than 50

years, deterrence has served us well, up to and including Secretary

of State Jim Baker’s warning just before Desert Storm in Geneva

to the Iraqi regime about the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Deterrence is still the best option until operations against al-Qaeda

have turned the corner and major progress, with U.S. leadership,

has been made on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Let me now frame some questions about a preemption strike.

How will we know that Iraq is planning to pass weapons to terrorist

organizations? Poor intelligence remains a problem. In 1990,

there were 1,800 technical and professional people working in the

nuclear program in Iraq, and we did not know it.

Or is simply possession of weapons of mass destruction among

the nations of the ‘‘axis of evil’’ sufficient? Will Iranian nuclear

power plants be next? Does it apply just to nuclear weapons, or do

chemical and biological weapons deserve the same treatment, because

a number of Islamic and Arab countries possess chemical and biological capabilities.

What are the red lines? What will we need, and what process

shall we use before a preemptive strike? I would hope that it would

be based on more than the circumstantial evidence that we have available at this time.

May the President declare an intent to strike without a declaration

of war from the Congress of the United States? What effect

does this policy have on other countries with whom we might have

disagreements in the future, for example, China?

Second, if you believe, as I do, that the United States has a

moral responsibility, as the world’s only superpower, to provide

leadership to at least assure stability, if not peace, why are we convincing

virtually none of the European countries, let alone the Arab

countries, of the need for an attack on Iraq? My sense is the Arab

countries will not support a campaign of this type without significant

movement toward peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

On a more practical level, we need bases, overflight, intelligence,

search and rescue, support from Arab neighbors in the vicinity of

Iraq, and from our allies, financial and troop support for nationbuilding

that would follow a successful military campaign.

With respect to the military campaign, war in the Middle East,

now as before, depends on logistics. Even with the astonishing

technical gains exhibited in Afghanistan, logistics is still the most

challenging aspect of this campaign. Strategic lift, both sea and air,

was my No. 1 priority on the Integrated Priority List when I was

the commander in chief at CENTCOM. It was at the top of Norm

Schwartzkopf’s list before me, and I expect it is still high for his successors today.

Getting to the region with troops, equipment, and supplies, and

most important, maintaining them through an operation of any size

will be key. There is no doubt we would prevail, but at what risk?

Risk in the military is simply the cost of American men and women

serving in the military who would be killed or injured in an operation like this.

The Iraqi campaign is a risky endeavor. To think that you can

support an operation of this type without control of ground lines of

communications and support from the sea seems to me to be remote.

For example, any logistics buildup would require an antimissile

defense for our troops. A Patriot missile battalion requires

over 250 CE–141 sorties from the United States or from the European

theater. The size of the force, how it will be deployed, where

will the logistics buildup be located, and the timeframe needed are all critical to success.

Finally, assuming a successful military campaign, we need at the

policy level in government a war termination plan. This is something

that we did not have in Desert Storm. In short, how do we

achieve a political status acceptable to our government. After the

expulsion of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the requirement of war

termination will include the establishment of a new government,

the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, a newly reorganized

armed force, and a police force, what has been basically described as nation-building.

Who will do this? Will there be a Marshall Plan for Iraq, a nation

of 25 million people? Where is the analysis of that cost, the people

and the funds and the equipment who will bear that cost?

All of these components need to be discussed both in open and

closed hearing to be sure that a preemptive strike on Iraq is the correct course of action.

I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, during the gulf war we believed

that he had the capability to deliver chemical weapons against us,

and in fact in the run-up, General Al Gray and I went down to

Quantico one Saturday to look at a simulation that had been done

regarding the two marine divisions that were going to be in the attack

into Kuwait, and there were some estimates of casualties that

ran in the order of magnitude of 10,000 if artillery rounds with chemical weapons were used.

So the issue is, are these strategic weapons, or are they tactical

weapons? Could they be used on troops in relatively short distances

of, say, 30 kilometers, or are we talking the cities of Israel and the

major cities in the Arabian area? I think there is a big distinction there.

I would also say that while in my mind it will always be murky,

the degree to which the regime has acquired these kinds of weapons,

particularly at the strategic level, that thus far we have not

seen him use this. The current regime has boxed him in. I think

the possibility of him using it goes up considerably if, in fact, the

regime is about to fall, and I think certainly that is a grave risk to take in the event of an invasion.

Senator, I think you touched on some very complex

issues. First of all, I do not believe that the Iraqi opposition

can be depended upon. I think from my own experience in the region,

that they were not worth anything during that time. Tony

Zinni, who followed me twice removed, felt the same way up to 2

years ago, and what the Iraqi opposition needs is a charismatic

person that is doing something to make the case for a regime

change, and that certainly is not Mr. Chalabi in Mayfair sending faxes to Iraq. That is the first thing.

Second, those people that have chosen to stand up and fight on

two occasions, the Shia in the south and the Kurds in the north,

have both been left in the lurch by the U.S. Government, so until

we are on the ground and winning, do not expect any help from

them, if that is what we are going to do.

How do we get allies into this game? I would say that pan

Arabism as a political movement and as an economic movement is

dead, but not as a cultural movement. From Morocco all the way

across the Arab world there is still a good deal of sympathy for the

Iraqi people, not the regime, but the people. We have to make the

case as a government, through public diplomacy and otherwise, and

we have not made that case to the Arab people, the Arab street,

as it is frequently called, why the change has to be made and why

it would be useful, and clearly, as Mort suggested, if there were

some movement on the Israeli-Palestinian side we would move a

long way, because most Arabs feel that is a far more pressing issue than the Iraqi issue.

With respect to cost, the sort of thing that is contemplated up to

and including large numbers of people on the ground, assuming a

military victory, would be very costly. Desert Storm, the Saudis

paid $17 billion as their share of that bill. Prince Abdullah told me

that he had been deceived, his word, by a senior administration official

on how the bills would be split up. There is very bad feeling

there. I am sure that the Kuwaitis, because of their special circumstance,

would help any way they can if we put pressure on them, but it will not be easy.

I think that all of the things that we have talked about here

need doing, but it requires a concerted effort on the Government’s

part, and I do not see that that work is being done at this time.

I would finally add that bringing the Russians into the equation,

and perhaps the Chinese, because that is the source of some of this

weapons transfer of materials, would help indeed, and shutting

down the oil that goes from Iraq through Turkey, $2 billion a year,

and providing another source for the fuel that goes to Jordan at a

reduced cost would also put greater pressure on the Iraqi Government.

Well, the bases are being replicated in Qatar

right now, so there are other options, but I would say in terms of

contemplating military action in that area, U.S. military action, air

space over Saudi Arabia is critical. If you were to not have the ability

to use Saudi air space, the problem would become extremely more difficult.

Senator, I do not think Tom and I are going to

agree with this, but I think Tony Cordesman’s thoughts this morning

about encouraging resistance without direct affirmative assistance

on the ground is at best an unethical and perhaps an amoral

approach. Given what has happened in the south to the Shia before,

I do not think that you can build that kind of support in the

south without a firm commitment on the part of the Government to come to their aid. On the ground.

I think that what little I know about the plans

that are contemplated about military action in Iraq, I think the

problem is always scarce assets. The intelligence, the Jstars, the

rivet joint airplanes, tankers, those things, I think there are adequate forces on the ground.

I think the carrier battle groups and that sort of thing, given the

current state in Afghanistan, has slowed down from the early days.

Whether or not you could sustain it, given the requirement for forward

deployment and so forth, I think there probably would be

some shortage. I read in the paper that some of the smart weapons

were used extensively in Afghanistan, but now those supplies have

been reestablished. I think there would be some problems, but I do not think they are showstoppers.

But I would again point out the much larger problem is, from

where do you launch these operations, and with whose help, and so forth.

Well, I think from Tom’s comments he believes

that a good deal more can be done with the new technology that

is available to us than I believe. I think that as Tony Cordesman

said this morning, you may be able to do this on the cheap, but in

the event that it does not work, you need to be prepared with a fallback position.

The old military belief is, you make an assumption, and then you

have an alternate plan to make sure that if the assumption does

not work, that you can in fact have another choice.

It seems to me that at the end of the day you are going to have

to put people on the ground. The Republican Guard divisions, their

loyalty to the regime, it seems to me that you cannot do that on the cheap.

Having said that, the very things that Tom has mentioned, particularly

with smart bombs, the command control communications

and so forth, has improved enormously, and it would be much,

much easier than it was in Desert Storm, but I am afraid you

would still have to put a fairly large number of folks on the ground.

I would be reluctant to put a number on it, because

I do not know what people that are much closer to this problem

than I—but I would say it is in that ballpark, yes, sir. It is

certainly not the 70,000 we have heard from time to time.

I think you also have to consider, Senator, the

cost to the economy. The price of oil went to $40 a barrel during

the gulf war. There is every reason to believe that some similar disruption

would take place to the American economy.

Senator, there are several hundred Kuwaitis that

were captured, and there is no trace of them as well. This is clearly

a national policy. There have been just Iranians that have been repatriated

recently from the Iraq-Iran war. I think we need to continue

to press in every possible way, but it would seem to me that

again, using the good offices of other countries, specifically the Russians,

and maybe others could help as well.

In the long run, I do not think any of us could speculate about

what role this particular tragedy would have in terms of national policy.

Sir, may I offer an explanation? With respect to

the Islamic world, there are three things going on simultaneously

right now, our efforts in Afghanistan, our obvious concerns about

Iraq, and the peace process, and those three are connected in the

eyes of the Islamic world, and if we lose track of that, we lose track

of the sense of justice, whether you believe it or not, or whether

you feel it is justified, that all of these things are connected, and

that, as Mort has said and I have said, if we were to make progress

on the peace process, many things would be possible for us. For example,

disarmament in the region after a peace process would be

a much easier hurdle to vault than to try and do it now.

I disagree with that violently, sir.